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1 . Introduction
Among the various options adopted by the actors pursuing an optimal economic 
performance as well as the accommodation of the needs and demands of individual 
companies in a fluid and fluctuating market1  open to global competition, two main 
processes have entailed significant transformations of the nature and structure of 
enterprises at national level and in regional and global contexts. On one hand, it is 
possible to outline various forms of decentralization of the enterprise, relating to the 
outsourcing of various activities, the use of agency work or self-employed workers or 
referring to the geographical scope of the externalization of production processes, both at 
national and cross-border level.
On the other, employers have opted to collaborate with other companies operating 
in the same market and performing similar or complementary activities, through the 
establishment of of various cooperation mechanisms which in most cases take the form 
of the group of enterprises. This option represents one of the tools available to companies 
to maintain their competitiveness and meet the new requirements imposed by a 
technologically evolved and globalized market, and allow employers to respond to 
(internal and external) flexibility and productive decentralization needs, without being 
necessarily forced to resort to relocation processes2.
Even if the emergence of these trends dates back several decades, their pace and 
significance has increased in recent years on account of the economic setting becoming 
increasingly globalized, so much that the need to take into consideration these kinds of 
transformation options may be a necessary pre-condition for any company wishing to 
operate and effectively compete in the global market.
1Araki T., The relationship between state law, collective agreement and individual contract:Japan’s 
decentralized industrial relations  with internal market oriented flexicurity, in University of Tokyo Journal of 
Law and Politics, Vol 10 Spring 2013, p.1
2Minolfi F. 2014, La contrattazione collettiva nei gruppi d’impresa: uno sguardo comparato, p.2
Furthermore, in the international setting various agreements and arrangements such 
as Mercosur, NAFTA and the TTIP set as their main objectives the removal of barriers and 
the facilitation of free movements of capital, goods and investments, fostering market 
access for economic actors and the transnationalization of business and companies: in 
the European integration process, the creation and the consolidation of the single market, 
as well as the various enlargement rounds3  carried out have entailed a significant 
expansion of the freedom of action (both in geographical and juridical terms) for 
economic operators and have been characterized by a highened mobility of undertakings 
of workers4 and services5  as well as the provision of specific frameworks in the area of 
company law6.
The legal responses and juridical solutions adopted by social and political 
institutions at the various level do not however evolve as fast as the economic dynamics 
governing these processes of enterprise transformation: on one hand, the various 
regulatory frameworks have different boundaries - not seldom overlapping - and for the 
most part they need to interact with the different national legal systems involved. 
Moreover, while it is possible to highlight regional developments, institutional 
frameworks and policies remain largely based and operating within the domestic setting, 
without providing control or oversight on transnational or global markets or addressing 
cross-border inequalities and imbalances. The latter are bound to raise the level of 
competition between economic actors, to create more political friction between countries 
and Governments involved, and to increase the contrast between the promotion of 
economic aims with the pursuit of social objectives through the adoption of domestic or 
international labour law instruments.
In the EU setting in particular it must be considered that on account of the 
interactions between the social policy decision-making provisions of the Treaty and the 
exclusion of certain key areas of labour law from the EU competences, the national 
diversities not seldom overcome the curdling of the European Social Model around 
shared values and fundamental rights. Labour law and social policy remain deeply rooted 
in the individual Member States legal systems and IR traditions, while the EU internal 
3Defined as  “a laboratory of globalization in one continent”. See Dølvik J. E. 2008, Mobility of Labor and 
Services across the Baltic Sea after EU Enlargement: Trends and Consequences, CES WP Series #161, p.3
4See Dirr. 96/71, 2008/104 and 2014/67
5See Dir. 2006/123
6See Reg. 2157/2001 and Dir. 2001/86 on the European company (SE) and Reg. 1435/2003 and Dir. 
2003/72 on the European Cooperative Society (SCE)
market law, based on the four Treaty freedoms, promotes cross-border movement of 
economic factors throughout the Union and the removal of obstacles by the MS7. 
These considerations appear of particular relevance because the various strategic 
options carried out - chiefly by the management’s side and therefore linked to 
fundamentally economic aims and objectives rather than social considerations or the 
accommodation of workers’ needs and demands - inevitably have an impact on individual 
rights and reflect themselves and on the structure of collective labor relations. 
The establishment of a group of enterprises - both at national level and in a 
European setting - represents a significant transformation of productive organization and 
of the corporate structure based on potentially complex relations between the various 
companies involved, developing both in a hierarchical top-down sense but also in a 
horizontal dimension. Employers may adopt more flexible options in the organization of 
their economic activities, which potentially result in a more pronounced flexibility of the 
labor management tools and collective relations practices in particular when the general 
absence of legal frameworks concerning collective bargaining for the group of enterprises 
is taken into account.
Over the last years, collective bargaining at national and supranational group level 
(an in particular in the European setting) has nonetheless increased, with a peak in the 
late ‘90s and early ‘00s; the lack of any legal framing, however, constitutes a limit on the 
options which can be adopted in pursuing the accommodation of the needs of 
companies and may significantly hinder the development of bargaining practices aimed in 
particular towards the promotion of working conditions and the protection of labour 
standards and rights8 along supply chains and beyond national borders9. 
This is particularly true for Transnational Company Agreements (TCAs), which do not 
fit into any of the various legal categories provided by domestic or international labour law 
and have been established drawing inspiration from various items of domestic and 
European collective labour law10. 
7Hendrickx F. 2009, Trade Union Rights in a Free Market Area: The EU Experience in Laval and Viking, in 
Blanpain R., Bromwich W., Rymkevich O., Spattini S. (eds.), The Modernization of Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations in a Comparative Perspective, p.55
8Jagodzinski 2012 in Schömann I., Jagodzinski R., Boni G., Clauwaert S., Glassner V., Jaspers T., 
Transnational collective bargaining at company level - A new component of European industrial relations?, 
ETUI, p.8
9IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group 2016, The role of law in global value chains: a research 
manifesto in London Review of International Law, Volume 0, Issue 0
10Schömann I. in Schömann et al. 2012, p.219
The often flexible solutions and the mechanisms established by the various parties 
and actors involved run the risk of increasing legal uncertainty and may accentuate the 
diversity between collective bargaining systems; dedicated regulatory frameworks would 
address a series of current issues and respond to a number of questions with respect to 
the nature of these instruments, their main features and content, as well as their legal 
effects and the possibilities for their application and enforcement. An effective regulation 
of the phenomenon would therefore allow the development of group bargaining beyond 
individual experiences and the evolution of specific negotiating strategies, strengthening 
the capacity of trade unions to act transnationally and ensuring in particular the 
protection of workers involved in complex business structures.
2. National groups and decentralized collective bargaining.
While a certain degree of collective bargaining at group level has developed in 
various national settings as an intermediate bargaining model, it must also be underlined 
that - beside some specific cases - the legal frameworks on the matter are generally 
lacking or inadequate and trade unions structures and action have developed in a way 
which does not take into account the specific level of the group of undertakings11; 
furthermore, employers appear unwilling to accept bargaining for the group as a whole 
and prefer to negotiate different agreements at company or plant level. In fact, the recent 
trends aiming at the decentralization of collective bargaining represent some of the most 
pervasive interventions in the field of collective relations12, hindering trade union action in 
their fundamental wage setting role, but also in other areas such as the working time 
arrangements and the use of temporary employment.
Two are the main aspects that need to be underlined; in primis, the norms regulating 
collective bargaining systems and procedures sit at the core of the national labour law 
and IR frameworks, and are strictly connected with the main features and the evolution of 
the contexts in which they produce their effects. 
The decentralization of collective bargaining and the individualisation of the work 
relationship entail the risk of a decrease in workers’ protection and the unbalancing of 
bargaining powers towards the management’s side, especially when it is considered that 
some recent reforms increase the prerogatives for employers and managers to unilaterally 
set the terms and modify the terms and conditions of employment set by the 
11Perulli A., Diritto del lavoro e decentramento produttivo in una prospettiva comparata: problemi e 
prospettive, in RIDL, A. XXVI Fasc.1-2007, p.50. In some cases, however, it is possible to identify special 
forms  of representation and coordination within group of enterprises linked in particular to health&safety 
issues
12In Spain, since the recent labour market reforms carried out in 2012, company level agreements  acquired 
priority of application; it is  therefore possible to negotiate worse conditions  than those defined at sectoral 
level (among the matters there are the basic wage, working time -including shifts and overtime- hiring 
practices, etc.), see Real Decreto ley 7/2011. A similar trajectory can be identified in the Italian experience; 
company agreements can deviate from the the ones negotiated at higher level and can even derogate from 
legislative provisions, although it can do it only at specific conditions and on the subjects listed by the law 
(and respecting the rights  protected by the Constitution and the EU framework). See Decree nr. 138/2011, 
art.art.art.art.8. Moreover, the El-Khomri project currently being discussed by French legislative bodies 
presents  as  its main feature the possibility for company-level agreements  to derogate from sectoral 
collective agreements and also from the rules of the Code du travail
agreement13. From this strengthened position employers may be able to put significant 
pressure on labour standards and on the exercise by workers and their representatives14 
of the rights to which they are entitled, hindering their effectiveness and increasing 
precariousness and inequality.
The context of rigour and austerity consequent to the economic and financial crisis 
has significantly accelerated the pace and the reach of deregulatory interventions in 
labour law, which in some cases have been specifically requested of the national 
governments of the Member States in economic difficulties15.
Therefore, even in the case in which a legal frameworks includes a set of provisions 
which specifically refer to group collective bargaining and regulate some of its features16, 
this recognition is not per se sufficient to define the existence of an intermediate level of 
negotiation allowing the definition of common standards in all the various companies and 
counteract the decentralization of collective bargaining. In order to identify a specific level 
of negotiation and to affirm its autonomy, it is necessary to verify its specialization with 
respect to the higher levels and its ability to conform the lower level agreements17. In 
particular, the agreement reached at the level of the individual company should not be 
able to deviate from the contents of the deal signed at group level, whether regulating 
13This possibility is  now explicitly provided in the Spanish system by the so-called clausula de descuelgue 
salarial. (art.85.3,c) of the ET). The modification cannot be however implemented unilaterally by the 
employer but must derive from an agreement with workers’ representatives or from the mediation by the 
labour authority. Furthermore, such a modification is linked to specific business  reasons or economic 
circumstances and can only be carried out for a limited period of time
14Davezies P. 2014, Individualisation of the work relationship: a challenge for trade unions, ETUI Policy Brief 
N°3/2014
15The most significant changes have been implemented with regards to working time, working time 
arrangements, atypical work, dismissal and redundancy rules, IR structures and procedures; while the 
interventions in the former two areas appear as temporary, the reforms on redundancy rules and collective 
bargaining systems represent more permanent modifications. In other cases the role of the social dialogue 
institution has been reduced and the trade unions rights and prerogatives have been transferred to different 
bodies such as  works councils and workers’ representatives. See Clauwert S., Schömann I. 2012, The crisis 
and national labour law reforms: a mapping exercise, ETUI Working Paper 2012.04
16The French law 4 May 2004 has formally recognized the “accords de groupe” which were previously 
mentioned in the the Labour Code only with regard to the the possibility of concluding group agreements  in 
specific areas  (such as  incentive wages) and, more importantly, were assimilated by the Cassation Court to 
company agreement. The legislative intervention, while reaffirming that such agreements are subject to the 
same principles regulating company-level bargaining, provides  that the negotiation is  carried out between 
the employer of the main company and representatives  of the other companies of the group and trade 
union coordinators taken from the trade union representatives (délégués  syndicaux) of the companies 
involved, and also states  a series of formalities and procedural requirements needed for its  validity. See 
Meriaux O., Kerbourc’h J.-Y., Seiler C. 2008. Evaluation de la loi du 4 mai 2004 sur la negociation d’accords 
derogatoires dans les entreprises. Document d’Etude DARES n.140
17Minolfi 2014, p.6
core wage and working conditions18  or rather focusing on specific aspects of the 
employment  relationship (as training opportunities for workers or redundancies), or 
setting standards and procedures in fields such as health &safety and technological 
innovation19.
The critical issue when it comes to collective bargaining in a group of enterprises is 
represented by the possibility of lower level agreements to derogate to deviate in pejus 
from the rules set by legislation or by a collective agreement of higher level: in this sense 
it is possible to highlight the Spanish case, in which the convenios  colectivos at group 
level are regulated20, but the company-level agreement can, in fact, derogate from them 
and set lower standards and condition. Similar group agreements, while allowing the 
accommodation of specific interests, do not appear able to effectively modify the trends 
already in place in most national settings, which have been based and justified on the 
position that enhanced flexibility of the labour markets represents one of the best 
responses to the fluctuations of the modern economic systems and have resulted in the 
implementation of the large-scale deregulatory reforms which have entailed the 
decentralization of collective bargaining from national or sectoral to company level21.
18It has been underlined how the standard setting by group agreements  could raise questions when the 
various companies involved in the negotiation operate in different production sectors, at least from the point 
of view of national/sectoral collective agreements  applied. The definition of working and employment 
conditions for all the various entities  would therefore cause a problem of consistency in the connection 
between contractual levels. Bavaro V., Laforgia S. 2014, Contrattazione collettiva e “prossimità delle 
imprese”. La struttura del contratto collettivo di filiera, distretto, rete d’imprese (online at http://
www.diprist.unimi.it/Reti_impresa/papers/14.pdf), p.8
19For a recent example in the Italian setting see Interpello Ministero del Lavoro nr. 17/2014, 6 october 2014
20Estatuto de los Trabajadores, art.87.1
21See on the subject Bellomo S. 2015, Transformation and Functional Evolution of the Collective Bargaining 
http://islssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Italy-StefanoBellomo.pdf
3. Group bargaining in the EU: main issues and challenges
As noted, at supranational level a steadily increasing number of collective 
agreements22  have been negotiated and signed between global unions and workers’ 
representative bodies and management of MNCs through various forms of collective 
bargaining23. However, given the wide diversity of the norms on collective bargaining and 
with respect to the legal nature and status of agreements between labour and 
management, it is not possible to identify a common core on which the parties to a 
transnational company agreement - which by definition spans different countries and 
interacts with several legal systems - may base their decision to enter negotiations or 
from which they can derive a binding effect for the agreement reached24. 
At EU level, notwithstanding the relevance of this setting in the context at hand25 as 
well as a long-standing interest by EU institutions and social partners in fostering the 
development of a clear set of rules on the matter, no concrete result has been achieved26; 
therefore no framework for EFAs is in place, with the consequence that a series of very 
important issues pertaining to their constitution, functioning and enforcement still remain 
in need of a clarification in order for this instrument to represent an integral part of the 
European IR system.
22The extremely varied “nomenclature” on the matter uses a wide set of terms  combined to give birth to a 
series of definitions and acronyms not seldom referring to the same kind of instrument and dependent on 
the position of the actors involved in the negotiations  (EIFs, EWCs and national trade unions). Jagodzinski 
2012, p.28
23 See da Costa I., Pulignano V., Rehfeldt U., Telljohann V., Transnational negotiations and the 
Europeanization of industrial relations: Potential and obstacles in EJIR 2012-18 and Blanpain R., Marassi S. 
2015, Globalization and Transnational Collective Labour Relations. International and European Framework 
Agreements at Company Level, Kluwer Law International 
24In some istances “model agreements” have been elaborated by global and European unions to support 
their affiliated organizations in negotiating, signing and implementing TCAs: these agreements cannot be 
however considered as mandatory but only provide a working structure and guidance on existing TCB 
practices
25In particular, it must be considered the legal seat of many of the MNCs involved in the signature of such 
agreements is represented by EU countries and the potential for legal regulation on the matter. See in 
particular art.5.2 TEU, art.7 TFEU (principle of conferral of powers), artt. 4.2, 5.3 and 153.1 TFEU (EU 
competence on internal market and social policy): another potential option relies on the provisions on social 
dialogue (Artt. 155.2 and 152 TFEU) supported by art.28 CFREU
26See Ales  E., Engblom S., Jaspers T., Laulom S., Sciarra S., Sobczak A., Valdes Dal-Re F. 2006 
Transnational collective bargaining: past, present and future. Final report, Eurofound 2009, Multinational 
companies  and collective bargaining, Papadakis  K. (ed. by) 2011 Shaping Global Industrial Relations.The 
Impact of International Framework Agreements, Eichhorst W., Kendzia M.J., Vandeweghe B. 2011, Cross-
border collective bargaining and transnational social dialogue, European Commission 2012, Report - Expert 
Group – Transnational company Agreement and Sciarra S., Fuchs M., Sobczak A. 2013, Towards  a Legal 
Framework for Transnational Company Agreements - Report to the ETUC
With regards to the subjects involved in the negotiation, a critical aspects is 
represented by the legitimacy of the negotiating agents; In order to ensure a genuine 
negotiation it is necessary avoid a top-down approach, which would interfere with the 
national dimension in which the agreements concretely take place, by involving all actors 
involved in the negotiation. It is therefore necessary to establish a system that can ensure 
a proper mandate from all relevant national bodies27  and allows to select actors which 
can effectively and fairly represent workers opinions, and are able to resist control and 
intervention by employers.
Within the various proposed frameworks the role and entitlements linked to the 
constitution of EFAs are usually assigned to trade unions rather than other representative 
bodies such as the EWCs28, which have nonetheless made use of their prerogatives29 to 
negotiate transnational agreements30  and monitor their application. While the EWCs are 
not necessarily adequate and reliable tool for collective bargaining at cross-border level 
may be founded, and it is only for the trade unions to create the link between their 
membership and the negotiation with the management side, in several cases TCB has 
been conducted by ad hoc trade union committees usually led by a dominant actor such 
as the unions of the parent company or even by the management itself. 
The definition of cooperation mechanisms and networking tools between unions and 
EWCs could yield positive effects in consolidating effective negotiations at the 
transnational level, given the latter’s bargaining experience acquired through the evolution 
of their role and their technical capacity in dealing with many aspect linked with the 
specific features of MNCs, deriving form their embeddedness and involvement in 
transnational settings but also from specific training programs implemented in order to 
enhance the competences of its members.
For what it relates to the contents of the negotiation, the main issues concern the 
fact that most agreements mention (ILO) standards, (UN) principles, (OECD) guidelines: 
27 van Hoek A. A. H., Finding a legal framework for transnational collective agreements  through international 
private law, CSECL Working Paper No.2016-02
28Perulli A., Contrattazione transnazionale nell’impresa europea e CAE: spunti di riflessione in Dir. rel. ind., 
fasc.2, 2000
29While, according to the legal framework set by EWC Directives (94/45 and 2009/38) such prerogatives do 
not include of foresee any involvement in TCB (leaving unanswered the question over their legal capacity to 
negotiate) EWCs are the only form of workers representation at transnational company level. Hassel A. 
2015, Workers  ʼVoice and Good Corporate Governance in Transnational Firms in Europe - Open Questions, 
p.19
30Frosecchi G., GDF Suez Transnational Collective Agreement on Health and Safety: EWC as  negotiating 
agent and the relevance of the ETUF leading role, WP CSDLE Massimo D’Antona.INT–119/2015, pp.14 and 
ff. and Gabathuler H. 2015, European Works Councils and transnational company agreements on 
restructuring
these represent very “soft” and ultimately non-binding instruments, and do not refer to 
wages and working conditions but rather to the establishment of more elementary labour 
rights, linked to the concept of decent work. At EU level the regulation of labour rights 
31should be carried out within the classical relationships and dynamics of European 
integration: EFAs could play however play a complementary role when utilized as a 
supporting tool in setting functionalized measures in the definition of specific subjects 
such as the promotion of health&safety or work/life balance. 
Granting these agreements a different scope than domestic bargaining would also 
allow to avoid the overlapping of this further level of negotiation with the existing 
hierarchical bargaining structures and ensure the compatibility of the contents of the EFAs 
with the standards set at national level.
In this sense, the question of the binding effect of the transnational texts does not 
appear of fundamental relevance, given that these agreements do not intend to regulate 
working conditions across national frameworks; however, a “soft” approach32  appears 
unsuitable for addressing the effective implementation of EFAs. The cross-border 
effectiveness, implementation and enforcement represents some of the main unsolved 
issues33 which hinder the development of these instruments and can be directly traced to 
the lack of formal and legal rules.
The creation of a legal framework for EFAs undoubtedly represents a highly complex 
task but would allow this kind of agreements to become an effective IR tool to address 
the power balance between management operating at trans-national level and nationally 
rooted labour, in particular going beyond an enforcement based on customary rules or 
voluntary options, which do not appear sufficient to reduce the legal uncertainty affecting 
these instruments.
However, the provision of uniform legal effect must take into account the significant 
diversity of the legal systems governing collective agreements in place in the various 
Member States: an intervention of this kind would represent an invasive interference with 
the national collective bargaining systems and would also present the risk of creating a 
31Based on international standards, the EU Treaties, the CFREU, and in specific items of secondary EU law
32Fichter M., McCallum J.K. 2015, Implementing global framework agreements: the limits of social 
partnership in Global Networks 15, supplemental issue
33Lo Faro A. 2011, Bargaining in the Shadow of “Optional Frameworks”? The Rising of Transnational 
Collective Agreements and EU Law, EJIR
fragmented framework of collective agreements with different legal effects (depending on 
the level of negotiation) within the same geographical area34. 
A viable regulatory option could be represented by the conferral to the EFA of the 
same legal effect of (company)  agreement concluded at national level; such a solution 
would undoubtedly take into due consideration the differences in the national industrial 
relations and labour law systems and create a straightforward connection between the 
result of the European bargaining with structures and practices already in place in the 
domestic setting.
However, this framing would only partially provide the required uniformity in the 
implementation of framework agreements, and does no appear sufficient to address and 
solve the continuing issues concerning the enforceability of EFAs, both within the trade 
union structures involved in the negotiations and their potentially dissenting affiliates at 
national level35, but also with respect to the tools available to the trade unions against 
employers in breach of the provisions of the agreement reached on the basis of the 
various national frameworks in which the agreement produces its effects36.
34Moreover, an intervention of this kind would not be able to address the continuing differences in collective 
bargaining systems when non EU-actors are involved in negotiation alongside Union counterparts. Zimmer 
2012 in Salvo Leonardi (eds.), European Action on Transnational Company Agreements: a stepping stone 
towards a real internationalisation of industrial relations?, p.33, Cafaggi F. 2013, The Regulatory Functions of 
Transnational Commercial Contracts: New Architectures, in 36 Fordham Int’l L.J.
35This critical aspect could be addressed and partially prevented through effective selection and mandate 
procedures, allowing an effective involvement of national trade unions enabling the European trade union 
federations at EU level to negotiate on their behalf (see above with reference to legitimacy of the negotiating 
agents for EFAs), as well as resorting to tools and instruments of international private law to ensure the 
adhesion of the national affiliates of the decisions undertaken by at supranational level and their compliance 
in implementing the framework agreement. Peruzzi M. 2014, Collective Power Across The Borders: the Case 
of Labour Representation in European Framework Agreements
36In this perspective the provision of a dispute settlement mechanisms may also be deemed necessary given 
that similar national systems already may not be applicable in a transnational setting and that, while in 
private international law it is possible to identify conflict-of-laws rules regarding individual employment 
contracts, no such references exist in relation to collective agreements.
